

CSO NOTICE TO GUARDIANS (C-NOTE #34)

DATED: 07 MAR 25

SUBJECT: SPACE CONTROL

FROM: CSO

TO: ALL PERSONNEL

UNCLASS

I said in [C-note #14](#) that *Space Superiority* is the formative purpose of the Space Force. As the service responsible for the space domain, we ensure that two conditions are true:

- *That we have the degree of control necessary for our forces to operate at a time and place of their choosing without prohibitive interference from space or counterspace threats*
- *That we deny that same degree of control to our adversaries*

This is the mission that drove the creation of a space service five years ago, and it is this mission that drives so much of our transformation today. But how do we achieve *Space Superiority*? We understand our desired outcome, but how do we make it a reality?

The answer to that is *Space Control*. As the Core Function dedicated to securing our nation's interests in space, *Space Control* encapsulates all the activities required to contest and control the domain. These activities range from reversible to non-reversible effects, scaling from interference to degradation to destruction via kinetic and non-kinetic means. In practice, we refer to such activities as counterspace operations, which we conduct across the orbital, link, and terrestrial segments of our architecture. *Space Control* capabilities can be active like an escort satellite or passive like an indications and warning sensor, but they all contribute to a collective space warfighting framework.

I often hear the question, "Is that capability an offensive weapon?" My response is to challenge the premise. Weapons are not inherently offensive or defensive. Is an F-35 an offensive weapon or a defensive weapon? The answer depends on how you use it. The Space Force presents forces to contest and control the domain and employs them to achieve Combatant Commander objectives. For example, in an offensive counterspace operation, we might employ an electromagnetic warfare capability against an adversary to gain the initiative and enable our scheme of maneuver. In a defensive counterspace operation, we might employ that same capability to protect friendly forces from adversary attack.

As we mature as a service, I expect these concepts to become ingrained in our mindset and activities, reflected in everything from capability development to training and operations. To that end, we are about to publish Space Force Doctrine Document—1 (SFDD-1), which will incorporate these ideas and more into a single foundational source. Once released, I ask all Guardians to internalize the concepts articulated within SFDD-1 and to consider how they should inform our daily work.

Like all military services, the U.S. Space Force exists to fight and win in its domain, and our ability to do so demands that we devise, refine, and master our way of war. If we are going to succeed, we must clearly understand our missions and the way by which we achieve them.

Semper Supra!