Space Threat Fact Sheet

The access to and use of space is of vital national interest. Intensifying strategic competition presents a serious threat to U.S. national security interests in, from, and to space. China and Russia are developing new space systems to enhance military effectiveness and end any reliance on U.S. space services. China and Russia are also testing and fielding sophisticated counterspace capabilities with the intent to disrupt and degrade U.S. space-enabled capabilities.

CHINA develops and operates space and counterspace capabilities as part of a military modernization strategy intended to achieve strategic decisive victory, strategic counterbalance, and strategic deterrence and control over the U.S. military in the Indo-Pacific region. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) expects space to play an important role in future conflicts by enabling long-range precision strikes and denying other militaries the use of space-based information.

♦ In 2015, the CCP officially organized its military space capabilities under the newly established Aerospace Force which was subsequently aligned directly under the Central Military Commission in Beijing in 2024.

China completed 37 orbital launches through June, boosting its total on-orbit payloads to 1,506, and is targeting 140 launches in 2026—a 52% year-over-year increase.
The PLA benefits from 510+ ISR-capable satellites with optical, multispectral, radar, and radiofrequency sensors, increasing its ability to detect U.S. aircraft carriers, expeditionary forces, and air wings.
As of June 1, China has launched 200 G60 and 168 SatNet communications satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO) as part of two planned mega constellations to compete with Western proliferated LEO (pLEO) architectures.
China uses at least 10 satellites to conduct on-orbit space situational awareness (SSA) that augment its network of terrestrial space object surveillance and identification (SOSI) sensors.
The PLA’s improving space-based capabilities and its growing arsenal of standoff weaponry combine to enable long-range precision strikes against U.S. and allied forces.
China has launched four reusable spaceplanes missions to date. The first was in orbit for two days while the second and third were in orbit for nine months. The fourth launched in February 2026 and is still in orbit.
Shenzhou-23 taikonauts are currently aboard the Tiangong space station, one of whom will conduct China's first continuous year-long stay in orbit. This turnover follows the recent emergency launch of an uncrewed Shenzhou, which was deployed after space debris damaged a previous spacecraft's window.

♦ In June 2026, China conducted the inaugural launch of the Long March-12B reusable space launch vehicle. This launch did not attempt to recover the first stage; however, China continues to make significant strides in developing reusable space launch vehicles (SLVs), an attractive technology for meeting its pLEO plans.

♦ In March 2026, a Chinese company launched the first commercial servicing satellite with a flexible robotic arm—Xiyuan-0 (Yuxing-03 06)—to demonstrate on-orbit servicing, refueling, and debris removal in LEO.

♦ China is preparing for the Chang’e-7 lunar south pole mission in August 2026. This mission is a key step in China’s roadmap toward a sustained robotic and eventual crewed presence on the moon.

♦ Intelligence suggests the PLA likely sees counterspace operations as means to deter and counter U.S. military intervention in a regional conflict. It is actively developing and fielding a wide range of counterspace capabilities.

In 2007, the PLA destroyed a defunct weather satellite in LEO with a ground-based anti-satellite missile. The capability evolved into an operational system intended to target LEO satellites.
The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency assesses the PLA probably intends to field ASAT weapons able to reach up to GEO at 36,000 km. In 2013, the PLA launched a ballistic object which peaked at 30,000 km, suggesting it may already have a basic ASAT capability against higher orbits.
China has already launched “inspection and repair” systems that could also function as weapons. In 2022, the SJ-21 satellite moved a derelict BeiDou navigation satellite to a graveyard orbit above GEO.
Multiple SJ-series and TJS-series experimental satellites have conducted unusual, large, and rapid maneuvers in GEO; tactics that could have several different military applications.
The PLA has multiple ground-based laser weapons able to disrupt, degrade, or damage satellite sensors. By the mid-to-late 2020s, the PRC could have higher-power systems able to damage satellite structures.
PLA military exercises regularly incorporate jammers against space-based communications, radars, and navigation systems like GPS. Intelligence suggests the PLA may be developing jammers to target SATCOM over a range of frequencies, including U.S. military protected extremely-high-frequency (EHF) systems.

RUSSIA has one of the world’s largest space programs and remains a capable space actor. Its experience and pedigree are unmatched outside the U.S. and are enduring sources of pride for the Russian people.

♦ Russia views space as a warfighting domain and believes space supremacy will be a decisive factor in future conflicts. However, Russian space technology has declined amid funding shortfalls, international isolation, and broader societal problems.

Russia conducted only 17 launches in 2025—well short of the 26+ annual launches it averaged from 1995 to 2015—and remained largely absent from the international market, launching roughly 10 foreign payloads.
Russia retains expertise in rocket engines and space launch; however, its launch activity increasingly lags the U.S. and China. Russia aspires for its newest cosmodrome to reduce dependencies on Baikonur.
Russia operates advanced ISR satellites for optical imagery, SIGINT, and missile warning, but Moscow is increasingly relying on civil and commercial providers. For example, Russian private military companies have purchased imagery from Chinese company Spacety to support combat operations in Ukraine.

♦ Even as Moscow promotes space arms control negotiations, Russia is researching, developing, testing, and deploying counterspace systems to take advantage of the perceived vulnerability of U.S. military dependence on space.

In November 2021, Russia tested its Nudol DA-ASAT missile against a defunct Soviet satellite in LEO, creating 1,500 pieces of trackable debris. This act endangered spacecraft of all nations in LEO, including astronauts and cosmonauts on the International Space Station and taikonauts on China’s Tiangong Space Station.
A large missile first observed on a MiG-31 aircraft at a test site in 2018 may be related to an air-launched ASAT missile named Burevestnik that will be “capable of destroying targets in near-space.
Russia has deployed probable orbital ASAT prototypes into LEO in 2017, 2019, 2022, 2024, and 2025. The four most recent were all placed in orbits matching those of U.S. national security satellites, and one ejected an object near a Russian satellite while testing a space-based ASAT weapon.
In June 2025, Russia launched a satellite into a peculiar high-altitude orbit, passing near numerous U.S. and allied satellites in GEO. It also released an unidentified object with which it has had repeated close approaches.
In September 2025, Russia launched “Mozhaets-6”, a military payload which the Russian media claimed was a small satellite that would be part of an “orbital squadron.”
In May 2026, Russia executed fuel-intensive orbital maneuvers to position four military satellites (Cosmos 2610 through 2613) close to a Western commercial radar satellite used by Ukraine for imagery intelligence.
Russia launched three satellites in February 2025 which conducted a series of maneuvers that enabled close approaches of under 1 km. Operations of this type could be used to threaten or collect on U.S. satellites.
Russia deployed Peresvet laser weapons to five strategic missile divisions starting in 2018. The system can mask missile deployments by blinding satellite sensors. Russia may deploy more powerful lasers by 2030.
Russia is also developing an ASAT capability using a new satellite designed to carry a nuclear weapon. Such a capability could pose a threat to all satellites and to the space-enabled services the world depends on.
Moscow has repeatedly said “quasi-civilian” commercial satellites used for military purposes “may become a legitimate target for retaliation,” and Russia demonstrated its willingness to use cyberattacks against commercial space systems during the Ukraine war. In 2025, Russia told international regulators it considered European satellites aiding Ukraine’s military to be “legitimate targets,” and Russia’s continuing electronic attacks on GPS and SATCOM across Europe have been called “extremely worrisome and unacceptable” by the International Telecommunications Union. Moreover, the United Kingdom’s Space Command has stated Russia persistently uses its ground-based jammers to target its satellites.

China is the PACING CHALLENGE and is rapidly improving its space capabilities to TRACK & TARGET U.S. military forces. China & Russia are pursuing a wide range of counterspace capabilities to DISRUPT & DEGRADE U.S. space capabilities.

(Current as of July 2026)